I construct direct measures of labor-leisure distortions for the American economy during the period 1889-1996, using a new method for empirically evaluating competitive equilibrium models and extending that method to some noncompetitive situations.
I. Introduction I. Introduction
This paper is essentially a study of one important "labor equilibrium" equation from economic theory, the one that equates a consumer's marginal value of time (MRS) to the "aftertax" marginal product of labor (MPL):
where t indexes calendar time, and J is the marginal "tax" rate. Equation (1) is implied by a huge class of models of the labor market including, but not limited to, various static general equilibrium models, various dynamic general equilibrium models such as the representative agent "real business cycle" models of King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) and Kydland and Prescott (1983) , (partly) noncompetitive equilibrium models such as Wu and Zhang (2000) , and models with discrete choice and heterogeneous agents such as Mulligan (1999) .
My approach is to separately measure MRS, MPL and J and "test" the equality (1). In doing so, I resurrect some old puzzles (eg., "Why was employment low during the Depression"), but also reveal a new puzzle, and help usefully quantify the old ones. A byproduct of the analysis is time series of the quantity of labor market regulation, and the aggregate effects of monopoly unionism.
II. Construction of the Direct Distortion Measures II. Construction of the Direct Distortion Measures

II.A. Functional Forms From the Literature
The labor equilibrium equation (1) would be most powerful if MRS t , MPL t , and/or J t could be measured directly, independently, and without error. This is not the case, but many (including, but not limited to, the papers cited above) have supposed that MRS t and MPL t are stable and fairly simple functions of output, average consumption, and work hours. In particular, a great many 1 MPL might instead be measured as aggregate labor compensation per manhour, but calculations would be essentially the same as those yielded by (2) because labor's share of output fluctuates very little during the century. WWII is one except, on which I comment below. 2 Hansen's linear utility function has the additional implication that labor is zero (or at its maximum feasible value) whenever 2c is strictly greater (less) than (1-J)MPL. Hansen (1985, p. @) derives 2c = (1-J)MPL as a condition of equilibrium, and my calculations offer some tests of whether this equality is true empirically.
studies have assumed that the marginal product of labor is proportional to the average product of labor, as it would be if output Y t were Cobb-Douglas in labor input L t :
where " is the coefficient of proportionality, aka "labor's share."
1 More than one function, but still relatively few, have been used in the macroeconomics literature to compute the marginal value of time. Two of those are:
The first value of time function (3) derives from time separable log utility, as used by King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) , and others. The second, equation (4), derives from the time separable and linear-in-labor utility function used by Hansen (1985) and others. Most of the literature cited has not been concerned with explaining behavior prior to 1929, and in doing so it may be desirable to consider a third value of time function (5) -one derived from a Stone-Geary modification of the log:
where ( is a subsistence level of consumption and (5) presumes that c t exceeds that level.
II.B. Data Sources
(2) and either (3), (4), or (5) can be used to compute time series for the marginal value of time and marginal product of labor. Or they can be used together to compute the marginal tax rate Ĵ implied by the functional forms and the labor equilibrium equation, as in equations (4)N and (5)N:
With a direct measure of the marginal tax rate, we can then test the labor equilibrium equation (1) by comparing measured marginal tax rates {J t } with those {Ĵ t } implied by the quantity series {L t ,c t /Y t } and the functional forms (2) -(5).
Hence, to compute times series for MRS and MPL we need four (per capita) time series:
real consumption, real output, labor input, and leisure time (which is essentially three series if we restrict labor and leisure time to sum to one). We need one less series to calculate implied tax rates: labor input, leisure time, and the consumption-output ratio.
I measure the four series for the period 1889-1996. "Consumption" c is measured as NIPA personal consumption expenditures (1889 ( -1928 ( from Kendrick (1961 Leisure hours might be measured as a residual from labor input, and this is essentially what I do during peacetime years. However, during the war years military employment was an important fraction of total employment, and the value of that time is probably dramatically undervalued by wartime military salaries, so I subtract cilivian and military manhours (denoted L and x, respectively) from a time annual endowment of 2500 hours per man, woman, and child aged 15+ to arrive at leisure hours. Not surprisingly, the subtraction of military manhours only has a noticeable effect on the level and changes in leisure hours during the war years. The MRS series based on linear utility is omitted in order to avoid cluttering Figure 2 , but will be displayed in Figure 3 which is the focus of my analysis.
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Noted that various prewar data series are interpolated between Census years. In particular, sector output fluctuations are often used to interpolate sector employment fluctuations between Census years (eg., Lebergott 1964, p. 440) . This tends to lead to too little variation in the output employment ratio for the interpolated years, and hence too little variation in my quantity-based MPL series. input. This is also true for WWII, although the reduction in leisure due to changes in military employment are also important. The consumption series mitigate, but do not erase, (i) and (ii) because consumption grows somewhat more rapidly than output during the Great Depression and less rapidly than output during WWII. The consumption series contributes to the 1980's increase in the MRS because consumption is growing more rapidly while labor input is increasing.
Comparing the MPL series with the MRS series, we see that the log and log-Stone-Geary MRS trend upward somewhat more slowly than the MPL. Not surprisingly, the Stone-Geary MRS Century of Distortions -8 grows more rapidly than the log MRS early in the century, and they are practically parallel later.
Since the MPL grows steadily throughout the century, the MRS fluctuations (i) -(iii) are each relative to the MPL.
III.C. Implied Marginal Tax Rates
If the labor equilibrium equation is to explain these different trends and fluctuations in MPL and MRS, it is with trending and fluctuating marginal tax rates. Hence the next step in my analysis is to compute the marginal tax rates implied by the labor equilibrium equation (1) Century of For example, a federal return in the 15% bracket, with labor income below the Social Security ceiling, filed in a year when the Social Security payroll tax rate was 7% on employee and employer, would be assigned a marginal tax rate of 23.7% (.237 = (.15+.07)/(1-.07)) which, according to Barro and Sahasakul's (1983) model of taxes, is the wedge between MRS and MPL for the person filing that return.
Barro and Sahasakul use data on the ratio of personal income to AGI to make an adjustment to their series for nonfilers prior to 1947 who are presumed to face a zero marginal tax rate. 
IV.A. Federal Labor Income Taxes
Of course, taxes on labor income are expected to drive a wedge between MRS and MPL.
I use Barro and Sahasakul's (1986) series on marginal federal personal income and payroll tax rates on labor income, as updated by Stephenson (1998) and Mulligan and Marion (2000) . To a good approximation, this series uses disaggregated data on federal individual income tax returns to compute, for each calendar year, cross-return averages of the statutory marginal tax rates. 
Century of Distortions -11
The trend over from the 1890's to the 1970's is reasonably well explained by the labor equilibrium equation (1). Implied marginal tax rates grew from roughly 0 to 30% while the federal marginal tax rates grew from 0 to 25 or 30%. In other words, federal labor income taxes and the labor equilibrium equation can explain a majority of the difference in the long term trends of MRS and MPL.
Short and medium term fluctuations of the implied rates are very poorly explained by the Barro-Sahasakul series. First, federal tax rates cannot explain why there were so many labor hours prior to 1930 (ie, why the workweek has been shortened) and hence why MRS is so high during that period. The shorter workweek has been explained as a wealth effect, which is partly captured by the Stone-Geary functional form (5) since consumption has risen more in real terms than has leisure time. There is substantial agreement in the literature that work hours per capita have declined (although see Schor's 1991 and Leete and Schor's 1994 dissenting view, and Stafford's 1992 and Juster and Stafford's 1992 reply), and that the decline is an income effect of some kind (eg., Hunt and Katz 1998, Owen 1979) . The shorter workweek is also explained by the Hansen functional form (4), but for very different reasons -consumption has risen less than has the marginal product of labor schedule.
Second, implied rates increase by 30 to 60 percentage points, depending on the preDepression benchmark year, during the Great Depression while there was hardly any increase in marginal federal labor income tax rates. Third, the implied rates derived from log and log-StoneGeary functions proceed to fall by 20 or 30 percentage points during WWII while measured rates rise almost 20 percentage points. Fourth, the implied rates rise after the war while the measured rates fall. These departures of implied from measured tax rates is one way of numerically demonstrating the unexplained (by economists at least!) employment reduction during the Depression and (according to Mulligan 1998) the unexplained employment and hours increases during WWII.
According to the linear Hansen MRS function, the wartime MRS is low, and implied tax rate high, when compared either to the 1930's or the late 1940's. This seems consistent with the labor equilibrium equation (1) since the Barro-Sahasakul measured tax rates increase and fall during the 1940's much like the implied tax rates. However, this result derives from wartime errors in the output series. If we were to measure MPL as labor compensation per manhour, rather than "Y/L, 7 ie, the mandated benefits exceed the amount workers would demand in the absence of regulation. See, for example, Summers (1989) for some analysis of this point. 
IV.B. Federal Labor Market Regulation
Labor market regulations are varied. Some may have no effect because the regulations require workers and employers to do things that they would already do, or because the regulations are not enforced. Others may lower the marginal product of labor schedule, perhaps by restricting firms from using the most efficient production process. But of particular interest for my study are regulations that drive a wedge between MRS and MPL. According to the textbook analysis, a binding minimum wage is one example because it puts some people out of work -a movement down the aggregate labor supply schedule -and moves employers up their MPL schedule (aka, labor demand curve). Mandatory fringe benefits, if they are valued by employees at less than their cost to employers, 7 also drive such a wedge.
It is hard to identify which regulations drive a wedge between MRS and MPL, let alone accurately quantify the wedge created by the large and varied portfolio of federal regulation.
However, recall from Figure 3 that the changes in implied tax rates to be explained are quite large -on the order of 10 percentage points or more for the entire labor force. Hence, even a rough qualitative analysis of federal labor regulation can reveal whether labor market regulation and its changes over time are a viable explanation. It is such a qualitative analysis that I present here. Of course, all regulations count equally in computing the dashed line, and there is no adjustment for the fact that some regulations do not drive a wedge between MRS and MPL, but rather decrease the MPL (or have no effect on either MRS or MPL). Nor is there an adjustment Monopoly unions, by definition, deliberately drive a wedge between MRS and MPL in order to raise member incomes. In the labor economics literature, the size of this wedge for union workers is often measured as a "union wage gain", rather than a percentage wedge between MRS and MPL, but the monopoly union wage gain can be converted to a wedge for union workers using Century of This wage rate can be viewed as the wage net of taxes and regulations unrelated to the monopoly union effect.Ĵ
the Cobb-Douglas production and utility functions. To do so, I denote the wage rate as w, with Cobb-Douglas production -which can be inverted to determine labor input as a function of w. If workers consume wL, then we can compute their marginal rate of substitution, 2c/(1-L) as a function of w. The MRS is not equal to MPL, except when w is equal to its competitive equilibrium value.
We define the union wage gain T to be the difference, in log points, between the wage rate that would prevail in a competitive labor market (ie, would equate MRS and MPL) and that prevailing in the presence of the union. We see from above how the wedge Ĵ created by the monopoly union can be calculated as a function of T and competitive equilibrium labor input (L* = 1/(1+2)):
Not surprisingly, equation (6) implies that the wedge between MRS and MPL driven by the monopoly union increases with the union wage gain T, and is zero when there is no union wage gain. Table 1 uses equation (6) to calculate the wedge implied by various union wage gains:
Century of Distortions -16 For these parameters, a marginal wage gain reduces worker utility
The columns in the Table correspond to different values of the parameters " and L*, and we see that wedges calculated from (6) are more sensitive to the wage gain T than to those parameters.
There is a large literature attempting to estimate the union wage gain for various industries. Lewis (1986) surveys that literature and Lewis (1963, eg., pp. 4f ) comments on how the wage gain appears to have varied over time. Both his 1963 and 1986 books suggest that there is no union wage gain in many industries, and that the wage gain averaged across unionized industries and time periods is no larger than 15 percentage points. He does suggest that union wage gains were highest during the Great Depression, about 25 percentage points when averaged across unionized industries. From Table 1 , we see that Lewis' estimates imply, for unionized sectors, tax wedges that are substantially larger than those driven by the income tax. For a typical union wage gain of 0.10, we have a typical wedge of about 40% for those in the unionized sector. For a wage gain of 0.25, we have a wedge of 70%.
The wedges calculated for the union sector are so large because labor supply and demand are fairly elastic under the Cobb-Douglas functional forms. It should be noted, however, that not I use Census Bureau (1975 Bureau ( , series D-17, 1900 to fill in Rees' missing nonagricultural employment for the year 1897. all sectors are unionized, and those that are unionized a probably not representative in terms of the elasticities of labor supply and demand. Indeed, while the Cobb-Douglas functions may well describe aggregate behavior, note that applying them to the union sector (as in My calculations of implied tax wedges are for the entire economy, and not just the union sector. How much can monopoly unionism affect the average tax wedge? Assuming the monopoly union wedge is zero for nonunion workers, the size of the monopoly union wedge for the average worker is the product of the union wedge and union density (ie, the fraction of the labor force that is unionized). Using Rees ' (1989 Table 1 The solid line in Figure 6 illustrates how changes in union density might affect the time series for the economy's average monopoly union wedge. The solid line assumes a nonunion sector wedge of 0, a Depression union sector wedge of 70%, and a nonDepression wedge of 40%. The solid line suggests that monopoly unionism should have created a wedge of 5 or 10 percentage points by 1920, which we don't see in the implied wedge series graphed in Figure 3 . Union membership growth during the Depression, and especially the assumed growth in the union sector wedge, add almost 10 percentage points to the economy average wedge in the 1930's, and might thereby explain some, but not all, of the Depression's implied tax wedge shown in Figure 3 . However, even though it is assumed that the union sector wedge declines from 70% to 40% after the Depression, the postDepression growth in union membership implies that the economy-average wedge is stable. The Lewis (1986) 
MRS/MPL)
, and compare them with direct measures of marginal tax rates. My comparisons partly resurrect some old puzzles (eg., "Why was employment low during the Depression"), but they also reveal a new puzzle, and help usefully quantify the old ones.
V.A. Additional Test of Linear Preferences
The linear functional form (4) for the marginal value of time has the strong implication that labor is zero (or at its maximum feasible value) whenever 2c is strictly greater (less) than (1-J)MPL. Equivalently, labor is zero (or at its maximum feasible value) whenever actual tax rates are greater (less) than those implied by the labor equilibrium equation 2c =(1-J)MPL. With direct
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Another question, beyond the scope of this paper, is whether the linear functional form can be reconciled with micro data (Mulligan 1999 Measuring the effects of regulation and unionism is a tricky business, and future research can undoubtedly improve on my efforts. Regardless what that research shows, one contribution of my analysis is to reformulate the old question "Why was employment low during the Depression?" as "What drove a 30% wedge between marginal product and value of time?". As Mulligan (2000) argues, this reformulation can direct those searching for explanations away from those that do not create tax wedges (eg., productivity shocks) towards those that do.
V.E. WWII
According to either the log-Stone-Geary or Hansen functional forms, MRS exceeds the after-federal-tax real wage during WWII, mainly because federal tax rates grow from practically zero to more than 20%. In other words, WWII leisure time is lower (or consumption higher) than implied by the labor equilibrium equation.
V.F. Leisure and Consumption Since 1980
Perhaps the more novel result from my calculations is that the value of time grew much more rapidly than the marginal product of labor during the 1980's. It appears that only a small part of this is due to marginal federal labor income tax rate cuts. Part may also be due to the decline of monopoly unionism, although more research is needed to determine how much this trend might have reduce the wedge between the value of time and the marginal product of labor.
VI. Appendix: Quantifying Labor Regulation VI. Appendix: Quantifying Labor Regulation @ forthcoming @
